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THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT CONFERENCE:
A REPORTER'S VIEW
Carol M. Rice*
As a professor, former civil litigator and continuing student
of civil procedure, I was thrilled to serve as one of several "re-
porters" at the Civil Justice Reform Act' Conference, in
Tuscaloosa, Alabama, co-hosted by the American Bar Association
and the University of Alabama School of Law. Although the
centerpiece for the Conference, the congressionally mandated
RAND Study of case management in federal court,2 drew a
mixed reaction,3 the Conference itself was a unique opportunity
for debate on federal procedural reform. Perhaps the most nota-
ble feature of the Conference was the participants themselves.
Gathered together in Tuscaloosa were more than 150 invited
procedural experts and enthusiasts: federal and state court judg-
es, leading practitioners, scholars, and officers of private legal
organizations, such as the American Bar Association and the
American Arbitration Association.
The Conference gave this diverse collection of lawyers a
variety of forums in which to debate and consider federal proce-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. Professor
Rice is a 1983 graduate of the University of Illinois College of Law and was a civil
litigator at the Chicago office of Kirkland & Ellis from 1983 to 1992.
1. In the Civil Justice Reform Act, Congress mandated, among other things,
that the district courts develop a "civil justice expense and delay reduction plan ...
to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on their merits, monitor discovery,
improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution
of civil disputes." 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1994) [hereinafter CJRA]. The CJRA directed ten
district courts to be "pilot" programs on reform and ordered a comparison study of
those pilot programs. CJRA § 471 note (1994) (reproducing Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. at 5097-98 (1990)).
2. RAND was chosen as the independent organization to perform the compari-
son study of case management techniques in federal courts mandated by the CJRA.
JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, JUST, SPEEDY, AND
INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996) [hereinafter RAND REPORT].
3. See John Gibeaut, Was RAND Right? Conference Attendees Differ on Whether
Civil Justice Study was Too Harsh, A.B3-_ J., May 1997, at 98.
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dural reform, ranging from the studied insight of specialists at
the plenary sessions4 to informal chat at meals and coffee
breaks. A significant part of this debate took place in the "break-
out" sessions in which the Conference attendees broke up into
nine groups, each with an assigned leader5 and reporter,6 for
more intimate discussions of procedural issues. The break-out
groups discussed the issues raised by the panelists at the
Conference's plenary sessions, debated reform proposals and
shared their varied experiences with case management.
Participants generally applauded the full and frank discus-
sions of the break-out groups, so much so that they suggested
that the work of the break-out groups be preserved. The nine
reporters of these groups met at the end of the Conference to
compare their groups' results and share their work with the
Conference's wrap-up speakers-Professor Geoffrey Hazard,7
4. The plenary speakers presented the papers that are the subject of this edi-
tion of the Alabama Law Review, including James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy
and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Jus-
tice Reform Act; Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery; Stephen N. Subrin, Uni-
formity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System: The
Case for Presumptive Limits; Bryant Garth, Observations on an Uncomfortable Rela-
tionship: Civil Procedure and Empirical Research; Judith Resnik, Changing Practices,
Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Jus-
tice, and Civil Judging; and Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change:
Who, How, Why, and When?.
5. The group leaders were Philip Anderson (the Little Rock law firm of Wil-
liams & Anderson), Dianne Dailey (the Portland, Oregon firm of Bullivant, Houser,
Bailey, et al.), Hon. Richard Fruin (Los Angeles Superior Court), Hon. David
Horowitz (Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court), Dudley Oldham (the Houston law
firm of Fulbright & Jaworski), Hon. Lee Rosenthal (United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas), Hon. Norma Shapiro (United Stated District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania), Jerome Shestack (the Philadelphia law
firm of Wolf, Black, Schorr & Solis-Cohen), and H. Thomas Wells, Jr. (the Bir-
mingham law firm of Maynard, Cooper & Gale).
6. The other reporters were Professor Janet Alexander (Stanford Law School),
Luke Bierman (American Bar Association), Professor Edward Cavanaugh (St. John's
University School of Law), Robert Evans (American Bar Association), Professor Marc
Galanter (University of Wisconsin Law School), Jack Hanna (American Bar Associ-
ation), Robert Hirshon (the Portland Maine law firm of Drummond, Woodsum &
MacMahon), and Robb Jones (Federal Judicial Center).




Judge Patrick Higginbotham,' and Dr. Deborah Hensler.9 As a
result, the final presentations of these three speakers reflected
at least some of the views of the break-out groups, but the
speakers did not purport to summarize the work of the break-
out groups.' ° The Alabama Law Review therefore asked me to
supplement that review and to report further on the discussions
of the break-out groups.
This is a broad overview of the opinions expressed in the
break-out groups. It is neither a complete record nor a definitive
analysis. I attended only the meetings of the break-out group for
which I was the reporter," but I am fortunate to have the
notes of four other reporters, Luke Bierman, Edward
Cavanaugh, 2 Jack Hanna, and Robert Evans, who preserved
and graciously gave me their notes. Even if I had been able to
attend every meeting of every group, however, I could not give
the definitive analysis of the break-out sessions. As Dr. Hensler
noted in her concluding speech, the views reported from the
break-out sessions were "as diverse as the local rules and as
difficult to analyze as judicial behavior." 3 Accordingly, in this
short article I merely continue my role as reporter and present
some of the views expressed in a few of the break-out groups, in
the hope that these views give some insight into the work of the
8. Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Dallas,
Texas.
9. Director, RAND Institute for Civil Justice, Santa Monica California.
10. Videotape: CJRA Conference, Plenary Session #7, "Where Do We Go From
Here?" (March 22, 1997) (on file with the University of Alabama School of Law Li-
brary) [hereinafter CJRA Videotape].
11. I served as reporter for the group led by Jerome Shestack, current president
of the ABA. Our group was representative of the Conference as a whole and includ-
ed: Hon. John Carroll (Magistrate Judge, United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama), Hon. Richard Enslen (United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan), Hon. Thomas Griesa (Chief Judge, United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York), Hon. Patrick Higginbotham
(United States Circuit Court for the Fifth Circuit), Professor Thomas Jones (Profes-
sor Emeritus at the University of Alabama School of Law), Professor Henry Ramsey
(Professor and former Dean of the Howard University Law School), Dennis Rose (the
Cleveland firm of Hahn, Loeser & Parks), William Slate (President of the American
Arbitration Association), and David Wagoner (International Arbitration Chambers).
12. Professor Cavanaugh analyzes the CJRA and the Conference in an article
published in the Federal Rules Decisions reporter. Edward D. Cavanaugh, The Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990: Requiescat In Pace, 173 F.R.D. 565 (1997).




Conference as a whole.
I. THE CJRA, THE RAND STUDY, AND EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH OF COURTS
Few participants spoke strongly in favor of the CJRA itself.
Those who vocalized their opinions tended to oppose the experi-
ment, raising one of several criticisms of the CJRA. Many felt
that Congress acted too hastily, without sufficient study, and as
a result addressed "problems" that may not even exist, or at
least problems that had not been sufficiently defined or identi-
fied by empirical research. Others criticized the proposed "fix" in
the CJRA. They felt that even if problems in federal case dispo-
sition existed, the CJRA was ineffectual because it directed the
judiciary to do what many federal judges already were doing-
case management. 4 Others were critical only as to certain as-
pects of the CJRA. For example, there was near unanimity in
opposition to local rules that contravened the national rules of
civil procedure, a phenomenon that many participants felt that
the CJRA created or at least exacerbated.
The RAND Study itself drew a somewhat tepid reaction.
Some views of the RAND Study merely reflected criticism of the
CJRA. For example, many participants said that they were not
surprised by the RAND Study conclusion that the case manage-
ment techniques mandated under the CJRA had little effect on
cost and speed of case disposition. 5 After all, many judges felt
that they already were doing what the CJRA mandated, before
the comparison study even began, and that there was no com-
parison to be made.
Other participants, particularly supporters of Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR), expressed disappointment, if not
14. Judge Griesa, Chief Judge of the Southern District of New York, was the
most vocal proponent of this view. In fact, he joined the final speakers at the con-
ference so that he could elaborate on this view that the CJRA primarily asked the
federal judiciary to do only what they already were doing. He used his own district
as an example and explained how it responded to the CJRA. See CJRA Videotape,
Plenary Session #7, "Where Do We Go From Here?" (March 22, 1997). See Thomas
P. Griesa, Comment: One Court's Experience with the CJRA, 49 AIA. L. REv. 261
(1997).
15. RAND REPORT, supra note 2, at 83 Table 9.2, 90.
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A Reporter's View
surprise, in the RAND Study's results. Some felt that the RAND
Study did not accurately reflect the importance of intangible
factors. For example, many advocates of ADR believe that the
primary benefit of ADR is party satisfaction; the parties like the
personal involvement and sense of control they get in many
forms of ADR. Although the RAND Study reported party satis-
faction as one of the effects of ADR, these supporters feared that
the RAND Study's report of this benefit might be lost among the
RAND Study's "hard data" results, such as ADR's reported mini-
mal impact on cost and time to disposition."
Other conferees questioned the methods of the RAND Study.
Indeed, they questioned any empirical study of the judiciary.
They felt that empirical studies often do not capture the true
value of case management techniques because they use a wrong
measure of effectiveness or fail to choose the proper cases for
meaningful comparison. Some groups, for example, believed that
the RAND Study undervalued case management in its ultimate
time and cost measurements by mixing types of cases together,
including both cases that benefitted from active judicial over-
sight and those that did not. They claimed that qualitative anal-
ysis of the cases was needed to screen the comparison cases
before any empirical study compared quantitative data.
These concerns were most frequently raised with regard to
studies of ADR. First, some participants noted that a compari-
son of case disposition rates may not be the proper measure of
the effectiveness of ADR. Disposition rates reflect early judicial
dismissal through motions, cases that arguably do not warrant
ADR. They suggested that the better test might be a comparison
of cases that go or would have gone to trial. Others pondered
whether the reported litigant and lawyer satisfaction with the
ADR process derive from the fact of settlement, which may occur
without ADR, rather than the ADR process itself. Still others
suggested that reports of ADR success rates might induce lit-
igants to file suit and take advantage of court-annexed ADR,
causing the ADR success rate to include cases that otherwise
would have settled privately.
On the other hand, some attendees were encouraged by the
RAND Study and called for more empirical research.' They
16. Id. at 71, 75.
17. Some groups asked that at a minimum the underlying data from the RAND
1997] 269
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argued that empiricism already has helped rulemakers avoid
making unfounded changes to the rules governing class actions
and discovery.18 Others felt that empirical data was needed to
combat popular misconceptions about judges, lawyers, and the
legal system. They complained that the public does not know
how judges spend their days or how a case progresses through
the system and that some critics of the system use unsubstanti-
ated anecdotal information to attack the judiciary. Empirical
studies and data would help counter that attack and promote
public (and Congressional) understanding of the work that is
actually done in the judicial system.
Some groups offered specific suggestions for further re-
search, both anecdotal and empirical. For example, many judges
urged that judges be polled anonymously for their thoughts and
suggestions for reform. The most common suggestion for empiri-
cal research was a study of state courts because state courts
have more variants on procedure and more cases to study and
compare. Specific suggestions included comparison of RAND
Study results to state court studies and a study of state courts
that had adopted case management systems against states that
had not. The groups also were eager to learn more about juries
and their selection. They suggested a study of six versus twelve
person juries, a comparison of a random jury against a jury
actually selected in a case, and a study of lawyer voir dire.
Finally, some participants raised a cautionary note for any
future studies. They feared that studies that compare actual
cases under different proposed case management systems raise
some of the same fundamental concerns as medical trials on
human subjects. Presumably, the purpose of any study of alter-
native litigation procedures is to evaluate whether new proce-
Study be made available for further analysis.
18. Two members of the panel on empiricism reported their recent experience,
as members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, with empiricism. Professor
Thomas Rowe, Jr., of Duke Law School, said that empiricism played a role in the
committee's proposed changes to Rule 23 governing class actions: they decided not to
collapse the three categories of class actions, currently embodied in Rule 23(bX), (2),
and (3), into a single set of standards for a class action. Likewise, Judge David Levi
reported that the current committee was reevaluating claims of discovery abuse and
calls for change to the discovery rules in light of empirical research that showed far
less discovery abuse than popularly believed. CJRA Videotape, Plenary Session #5,
'Empiricism and Procedural Change" (March 21, 1997).
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dures bring advantages over existing methods. Whether the new
system under study proves to be beneficial or detrimental, the
study participants-actual litigants with real money at stake-
would not all get the same procedural opportunities and advan-
tages. Although these conferees stopped short of saying that
such studies violate the due process rights of the studied liti-
gants, they urged study planners in the future to consider and
address due process and fairness concerns.
II. GENERAL CASE MANAGEMENT AND LocAL RULES
Most participants supported the general concept of judicial
case management and felt that it as a whole has improved dis-
position of cases in federal court. Many of the federal judges
perceive that cases are settling earlier and that fewer are going
to trial. Some reported that case management has a positive
effect on lawyers even before the case is filed. They claim for
instance, that a plaintiff's lawyer may wait to file suit and better
prepare his case in anticipation of the judge imposing deadlines
once the case is filed.
Yet, despite this general support for "case management,"
Conference participants could not agree as to what constituted
"management" by a judge. Some opposed active judicial manage-
ment as an ineffectual use of judicial resources. They claimed
that lawyers and parties are capable of managing their cases
themselves so long as they know that the judge will be firm and
enforce the rules with sanctions. Thus, even this group believed
in some form of judicial management-a strong judge who in-
sists that the parties comply with the rules and set and meet
their own deadlines-even though they may not characterize it
as "case management."
For the most part, the Conference attendees agreed with
Judge Schwarzer's assessment that case management is "more
of an art than a science."19 A particular technique might work
well for one judge in one type of case but not work as well for
another judge or even for the same judge in a different case.
Therefore, most participants, especially the judges, argued for
19. William Schwarzer, CJRA Videotape, Plenary Session #2, "Discovery and
Judicial Case Management" (March 20, 1997).
1997]
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flexibility in the rules governing case management. Many felt
that the current rules, particularly Rule 16,0 give judges suffi-
cient power and guidance to effectively manage and dispose of
cases. Although most participants agreed that judges should
hold mandatory Rule 16 conferences early in the case-within
six months of filing 21-- they also reported that some judges do
not hold early, or in some cases any, Rule 16 conferences.
Inconsistent application of existing rules and available tech-
niques prompted some conferees to urge that judges be educated
in case management techniques. Others argued that the Federal
Judicial Center already teaches case management, noting that
over the past twenty years of training programs for new federal
judges, "case management" has evolved from a relatively insig-
nificant side issue to a major focus of the program. This group
claimed that the problem was more fundamental: the constitu-
tionally mandated independence of federal judges limits what
Congress, or even other judges, can do to promote a discretion-
ary function such as case management by recalcitrant judges.
Another subject of spirited debate was the proper relation-
ship between local rules and case management techniques. First,
the groups differed on the effect of local rules on case manage-
ment. All seemed to agree that a judge needs discretion to prop-
erly manage a case. Some groups expressed a concern that a
prohibition against local rules would tie a judge's hands and
impair his or her discretion. Others believed the opposite. They
argued that local rules, not national rules, unduly inhibit the
individual judge and that the general dictates of the national
rules give federal judges sufficient guidance and discretion.
The debate about local rules was confounded by definitional
problems. The groups seemed to disagree as to what constituted
the "rules" that they were debating. Most seemed to support
"supplemental" or "housekeeping" rules on a district or individu-
20. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a district judge to
hold pre-trial conferences at which the court and the parties may discuss topics such
as the control and scheduling of discovery, settlement and ADR options, and any
other matter that "may facilitate the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the
case." FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c).
21. Some districts mandate early conferences by local rule. See, e.g., W.D. MICH.,
LOCAL R.: Differentiated Case Management Plan, 3 (within 45 days); N.D. OHIO,
LOCAL R. 16.1(b)(2) (within 30 days as a general rule).
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al judge basis. A judge, for example, should have discretion to
run his or her own courtroom and set the time and day for rou-
tine motion call or tell the lawyers where to stand and sit in the
courtroom. Beyond that point, however, the groups could not
agree as to the proper use of rules by individual judges or by
districts.
Some members of the break-out groups argued for recogni-
tion of the reality of judicial preferences. Most judges have at
least some preferences as to how the parties should proceed.
These groups felt that fairness dictated that parties be informed
of a judge's idiosyncratic preferences to prevent surprise and to
avoid giving local lawyers an unfair advantage. But even this
group disagreed as to whether these preferences constitute local
"rules" and whether a judge should communicate his or her
preferences informally or in written guidelines.
Other attendees argued that "rule-making" by judges too
often gets out of hand. They complained of districts where judg-
es regulate minutia through their own set of rules or
"guidelines," such as a 10-page memoranda on summary judg-
ment practice. Those of this view tended to oppose any form of
rule-making by individual judges, but conceded that to the ex-
tent that such rules exist at all, they should be in written form.
They believed that the confusion of individualized rules is only
compounded when the rules and standards are not clearly set
out in writing.
Finally, the groups debated the proper subjects of local
rules, such as discovery management. Some contended that
discovery limits are like speed limits and that some districts
have circumstances that warrant specialized restrictions on
discovery, such as the length and number of depositions. Others
argued that a single standard should govern discovery nation-
wide so long as it has sufficient flexibility to enable a judge to
tailor discovery requirements to a particular case. The appli-
cation of the rule may differ, but the rule would remain the
same. Some cited the widely varying status of the new mandato-
ry disclosure provisions, and the resultant forum shopping be-
tween districts, as an illustration of the harm of local differences
in discovery standards.'
22. As part of the CJRA mandate, some districts experimented with disclosure
1997] 273
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III. DISCOVERY
The general consensus about discovery reform was to tread
carefully. Most participants felt that the popular perception of
problems in discovery was overblown. Some types of cases have
discovery problems, and individual lawyers and litigants may
abuse discovery, but discovery works well enough in most cases.
Yet, most attendees at the Conference wanted to see improve-
ment. As Professor Hazard perceptively noted, the troops are
"sullen but not mutinous." '
The discussions in the break-out groups reflected widely
varying views on any given discovery reform or proposal. This
difference of opinion was illustrated by the group's reaction to
the new mandatory disclosure provisions in the national
rules.' Some participants supported disclosure because it can
streamline formal discovery and reduce costs, especially given
that most of the information subject to the disclosure require-
ments under the national rule is (or should be) sought by liti-
gants in the typical case in any event. Others feared that disclo-
sure is too open to abuse. Some felt that the new disclosure
rules take discovery out of the adversary system and put it into
the realm of professional responsibility. They believed that be-
cause disclosure is largely self-executing, an individual lawyer's
own ethics, not the diligence of opposing counsel, will determine
what information is exchanged.
The groups also disagreed as to whether mandatory disclo-
sure has proven to be effective. Judges generally thought disclo-
requirements. For example, unlike the national rule that limits disclosure to materi-
als "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings," see FED.
R. Cirv. P. 26(aXl)(A) and (B) and infra note 24, the Southern District of Illinois ties
its initial disclosure to information and documents that "bear significantly on the
claims and defenses." S.D. Ill., Local R. 12.(aX1XA) & (B). Other districts opted out
of the disclosure rule altogether. For a summary of the statutes of the disclosure
rules in the 94 district courts, see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPEPORT (March
1996).
23. CJRA Videotape, Plenary Session #7, "Where Do We Go From Here?"
(March 22, 1997).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a). (The disclosure provisions of Rule 26(a) fall into three
categories, initial disclosure at the beginning of the suit of certain "core" information,
exchange of expert witness information following most of the discovery, and pre-trial
exchange of trial information such as witness lists.).
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sure was working, while the lawyers were more pessimistic,
particularly as to the initial disclosure of core information under
Rule 26(a)(1). Some lawyers believed that litigants just go
through the motions and do not actually exchange the informa-
tion as required under the disclosure rules. However, both judg-
es and lawyers were more enthusiastic about the new expert
disclosure rules of Rule 26(a)(2), though some believed that even
these disclosures unduly increase costs.
The views were equally varied as to other discovery reform
topics and proposals, including those collected and proposed by
Professor Paul Carrington.' First, as to the proposal that the
loser always pay for the costs of any discovery motion, opponents
feared it would inhibit parties, especially plaintiffs in contingent
fee cases, from pursuing legitimate discovery needs. Supporters
liked fee shifting precisely because of its influence on the par-
ties; they hoped it would encourage parties to settle the dispute
themselves. One group reported that California state courts
already have had success with a fee shifting system.26 This
group noted that in California, the lawyer, not the party, usually
pays the costs of lost discovery motions, and this group likewise
supported the idea of the lawyer paying for discovery disputes in
federal court.
Similarly, some lawyers, particularly defense counsel, op-
posed a prohibition against settlement agreements that would
require the destruction of discovery materials, while others
wanted such a ban to avoid redundant costs and encourage full
revelation of the facts in future cases. Still others were non-
committal, noting that settlement often would not be reached
without confidentiality of discovery materials. Similarly, many
had a mixed reaction to a rule that would require parties to
immediately produce an "adopted witness statement," a state-
ment signed by the witness for example, rather than withhold-
ing it as work product in the first instance. They had no real
objection to such a rule, but they also recognized that the new
rule would mean that lawyers would create fewer adopted wit-
ness statements.
Deposition reform also sparked debate. Some, particularly
25. Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51 (1997).
26. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1997).
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judges, generally liked pre-set limits, such as time restrictions
on the length of deposition or limits on the number of deposi-
tions that a side may take. The lawyers were wary. They felt
that one party can too easily manipulate such limits, and that
debate over these limits would produce excessive satellite litiga-
tion. Similarly, some lawyers did not see the need for a rule
requiring a lawyer to hold objections until the end of a deposi-
tion. They argued that if lawyers simply state the objection, they
will not unduly interfere with the deposition, will better pre-
serve privileged or protected material, and may even help the
deposing lawyer by pointing out the flaw in his question. Others
agreed with this ideal procedure, but argued that lawyers do not
live up to this ideal in practice.
Thus, as a whole, the Conference participants seemed to
oppose any wide-sweeping changes to the discovery rules. They
instead preferred to use methods available under the current
rule structure to control discovery abuse. Not surprisingly
though, the groups disagreed as to how to best use even the ex-
isting rules. For example, most attendees agreed that litigant
access to and prompt rulings by a judicial officer was essential
to curb discovery abuse, but they disagreed as to the degree to
which sanctions should be imposed. Some, particularly the law-
yers, argued for increased use of sanctions, while others, includ-
ing a number of judges, cautioned against over-aggressive en-
forcement through sanctions.
The groups likewise disagreed as to whether the supervising
official should be the district judge or the magistrate judge.
Some argued that district judge supervision would give the
judge greater familiarity with and control over the case and the
lawyers, thereby better deterring abuse by litigants. Others were
concerned about the time constraints and limited availability of
district court judges. They felt that magistrate judges give dis-
tricts more options to innovate solutions to discovery abuses. For
example, the Western District of Michigan actively uses its mag-
istrate judges to control discovery abuse: when a party believes
that the other is obstructing depositions, it can go to the court-




IV. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR)
Most participants were in favor of ADR, at least in some
form, and believed that ADR was "here to stay."" Despite this
consensus, the discussion of ADR was confounded in part by
differing perceptions and perhaps confusion about ADR. This
problem was demonstrated by the break-out groups' discussion
of the relative merits of arbitration. Some groups defended arbi-
tration, saying that it is disliked for reasons that are no longer
true-that arbitration is mistakenly considered to lead to "split"
results. Yet other groups praised mediation for reaching creative
"win/win" solutions, in contrast to arbitration which they charac-
terized as more often resulting in a firm judgments for one side
or the other.
Much of the problem arose from inaccurate terminology.
Most courts apparently use a single form of ADR, often with
labels or procedures that do not correspond to ADR used in
other courts. "Mediation," which seemingly is the most common
form of court-annexed ADR, means different things in different
courts. Some apparently call discussion of settlement at a Rule
16 conference mediation; whereas, others consider mediation to
be a formal process guided by an outside neutral. Indeed, some
Conference participants suggested that even the term "ADR" is
no longer a good description of the process because the term "al-
ternative" connotes a secondary rather than primary means of
dispute resolution. They suggested that better terms might be
"Appropriate Dispute Resolution" or "Satisfactory Dispute Reso-
lution."
Even when the groups agreed on terminology, they dis-
agreed as to the mechanics of using ADR, such as the optimum
timing of ADR. Many thought that ADR should wait until the
parties have conducted at least some discovery. Others felt that
discovery is precisely one of the problems of the traditional court
system that ADR seeks to avoid. Still others believed that the
amount of discovery will depend both on the type of case and the
ADR method. Arbitration, for example, likely will need more dis-
covery than mediation.
27. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., CJRA Videotape, Plenary Session #7, "Where Do We
Go From Here' (March 22, 1997).
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Another hotly debated issue was Whether court-annexed
ADR should be mandatory. Private ADR usually is binding, but
court-annexed ADR rarely is. Some felt that court-annexed ADR
needs to be mandatory in order to work. Others felt that even
though the initial decision to go to ADR may be "forced" upon
the parties, the parties should have some say in its operation.
They suggested, for example, that the parties should choose
their own mediator or neutral rather than having to use a per-
son selected by the court.
Others felt that ADR should not be pressed on the parties.
Some feared that ADR can be harmful in certain cases. They
cited as an example domestic disputes and argued that the man-
datory mediation often required in domestic cases is ineffectual
and perhaps dangerous in cases of domestic violence. Some op-
posed mandatory ADR because it can waste the party's time and
resources for little gain. An experienced lawyer may know the
value of the case far better than a mediator. And ADR can be
costly. Some claimed that ADR in complex cases is more expen-
sive, not cheaper, than traditional court resolution. Indeed, one
group characterized the cost of ADR as a "hideous expense."
The cost of ADR prompted some to raise the concern that
private judges and other forms of private ADR create unequal
access to justice. In places such as California, where litigants
routinely pay for private judges, the cost of ADR can be quite
high, giving the impression that only the rich can afford this
form of justice. Others argued that the rich leaving the official
court system actually gives the poor greater access to the courts.
In addition, they noted that ADR need not be expensive. Public
judicial personnel, such as magistrate and senior status district
court judges, can, and do, act as neutrals at no extra charge to
those who cannot afford private ADR. Others questioned wheth-
er such use of federal employees was proper given that the pub-
lic already is paying for and providing a judicial system for reso-
lution of disputes.
The groups also debated the advisability of the district judge
personally engaging in ADR. Some opponents had a fundamen-
tal concern. They believed that the role of the federal district
judge is to fulfill the judicial functions contemplated in Article
III, not to act as outside counselor. If a party files a suit in fed-
eral court, he is entitled to have his case heard. Others coun-
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tered that a judge is fulfilling his judicial function when he facil-
itates ADR. Rule 16, for'example, directs a judge to "facilitat[e]
settlement."' This group believed that judges have the power,
and perhaps the duty, to at least educate and advise litigants
about ADR. Still others supported court-annexed ADR but op-
posed, for strategic reasons, direct involvement by the judge.
They felt that the judge might interfere with the collaborative
process of ADR. For instance, litigants may be more civil and
willing to listen in ADR, out of fear that an outside neutral,
unlike a judge, would hold bad behavior against them.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the CJRA Conference break-out groups reached a
consensus as to few points of federal procedural reform, their
varying opinions were themselves instructive. Indeed, the break-
out groups showed that federal courts are using many different
techniques to manage their caseloads, to varying effect. More-
over, the break-out group debate about these techniques not only
helped flesh out the perceived advantages and disadvantages of
different reform proposals, but also exposed some of the flaws
impeding debate about reform, such as confused terminology and
misconceptions about actual practices. Having had this opportu-
nity to share and learn from each other they can better propose,
evaluate, and implement procedural reform.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a). See also supra note 20.
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